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The ethics of deception in cyberspace
Neil C. Rowe





We examine the main ethical issues concerning deception in cyberspace.  We first discuss the concept of deception
and survey ethical theories applicable to cyberspace.  We then examine deception for commercial gain such as spam,
phishing, spyware, deceptive commercial software, and dishonest games.  We next examine deception used in
attacks on computer systems, including identity deception, Trojan horses, denial of service, eavesdropping, record
manipulation, and social engineering.  We then consider several types of deception for defensive purposes, less well
known, including honeypots, honeytokens, defensive obstructionism, false excuses, deceptive intelligence collection,
and strategic deception.  In each case we assess the ethical issues pro and con for the use of deception.  We argue
that sometimes deception in cyberspace is unethical and sometimes it is ethical.
 




Deception is a ubiquitous human phenomenon (Ford, 1996).  As the Internet has evolved and diversified, it is not
surprising to find increasing deception in cyberspace.  The increasing range of Internet users in particular, and the
development of Internet commerce, has provided many opportunities and incentives.
 
Deception is a technique for persuading or manipulating people.  We will define deception as anything to cause
people to have incorrect knowledge of the state of the world.  This includes lying but also misleading.  Deception in
cyberspace can be used both offensively (to manipulate or attack computer systems, networks, and their users) or
defensively (to defend against manipulations or attacks).  Most ethical theories proscribe most forms of deception
while permitting some kinds (Bok, 1978).  Deception smooths social interactions, controls malicious people, and
enables doing something for someone’s unrecognized benefit (Nyberg, 1994).  The harms of deception are the
failure to accomplish desired goals, and the often long-term damage to the trust necessary to sustain social
relationships, without which much human activity could not be accomplished.
 
(Quinn, 2006) provides a useful categorization of ethical theories applicable to computer technology.  He identifies
subjective and cultural relativism, divine-command theory, Kantian rule-based ethics, social-contract theory, and act
and rule utilitarianism.  Subjective relativism, cultural relativism, and divine-command theory do not fit well with
cyberspace because cyberspace is a social resource that spans diverse cultures with diverse opinions, and it needs
cooperation to work properly.  Kantian rule-based ethics is difficult to apply in general, though it helps resolve
specific issues.  Social-contract theory is useful but may not provide specific enough guidance to resolve a particular
ethical dilemma.  Alternative formulations to cyberethics such as the "disclosive" approach of (Brey, 2000) can also
be explored but they are relatively new.
 
That leaves utilitarianism, which attempts to decide ethical questions by assessing the net benefit to society of a
particular act or ethical rule.  So we will follow a utilitarian approach here, and rule utilitarianism in particular.  We
shall say a particular policy of deception is ethical if its net of benefits minus costs, in general to a society in the long
term, exceeds that of not deceiving, else it is unethical (Artz, 1994).  Benefits include achieving the goals of the
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deceiver and the value of those goals.  Costs include the direct damage caused by the deception as when its goals are
malicious, direct costs of the deception being discovered such as retaliation, and indirect costs of discovery such as
increased distrust of the parties.  In cyberspace for instance, if someone is attacking your computer, a deception that
could make them go away could be justified if the cost of a successful attack on the computer is hours of work to
reinstall the operating system and damaged files.  Both benefits and costs must be multiplied by probabilities to
obtain expected values when they are uncertain due to such factors as whether the deception will succeed or whether
it will be discovered. 
Background
 
Deception can be verbal or nonverbal (Vrij, 2000).  Verbal methods include outright lying, equivocation, failing to
state key information, false claims, and false excuses.  Nonverbal methods include mimicry, decoying, and various
nonverbal forms of pretense.  People use deception everyday without being aware of it, and many areas of human
activity could not function without deliberate deception such as police work, law, politics, business negotiation,
military actions, and entertainment.  Much deception as practiced is unjustified, however.  Hence there is an
extensive literature on detection of deception (Vrij, 2000).  Human deceivers try to control the information they
reveal, but it is hard to control all the channels of communication, and the truth often "leaks out" through secondary
channels.  For instance, people who lie tend to fidget, hold their bodies rigidly, and use an unusual tone of voice. 
Deception can also be detected in verbal utterances from the use of vagueness, exaggeration, high frequency of
negative terms, and especially inconsistency between different assertions.  But deception detection is difficult in
general, and attempts to build automated "lie detectors" have not been very successful.
 
Cyberspace is well suited for many forms of deception because of the difficulty of obtaining collaborating
information when assertions are made (Fogg, 2003).  For instance, a policeman can  pretend to be a 14-year-old girl
online to entrap pedophiles.  At the same time, a "phisher" can pretend to be a bank by implementing a fake Web site
to steal personal data from victims.  In addition, the connectivity of the Internet enables social interactions over long
international distances, and the speed of the Internet permits damage to be done and criminals to disappear quickly
(Spinello, 2003).  Cyberspace relationships are usually weaker than real-world relationships because of the limited
communications bandwidth, so there is less pressure of social obligation to act in a trustworthy manner
(Castelfranchi, 2000).  So many problems of deception are worse in cyberspace than in the real world, although there
are important differences between offensive (attacking) and defensive deception  (Rowe and Rothstein, 2004).
 
Software itself can deceive, as its deception methods can be programmed.  We will argue that the ethical issues with
such software devolve on the programmer, since the software acts as their agent.  Thus there are similar issues with
deceptive software and deceptive people who program it.  However, new developments in artificial intelligence are
continuing to increase the human-like characteristics of software, and we can now conceive of automated agents
with their own distinct ethics (Allen, Wallach, and Smit, 2006).
 
The two main professional societies for information-technology professionals, the ACM and the IEEE Computer
Society, have a joint policy on ethics (ACM/IEEE-CS, 1999).  But it does not address many key issues.  For
instance, it proscribes deception in speaking to the public about software, but says nothing about writing deliberately
deceptive software or foisting malicious cyber-attacks.  So we need to develop further ethical principles for
cyberspace.
Deception in electronic commerce and commercial software
 
The first association most people make with the term "deception in cyberspace" is fraudulent electronic commerce. 
Cyberspace supports analogs of many common scams.  However, new ethical problems occur in electronic
commerce as well.
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Electronic-commerce scams
 
Commercial email and Web sites are susceptible to a wide variety of deceptions ranging from misleading advertising
to outright fraud (Leitch & Warren, 2000).  Since the bandwidth of the Internet limits the amount of information one
can obtain about a product for sale or a customer in electronic commerce, deception is more of a danger than in
traditional commerce.  For instance, ineffective medicines or cheap imitation electronic products can be advertised,
customers can take products without paying by various ploys, and both buyers and sellers in electronic auctions can
be cheated by parties failing to deliver goods or payment.  Poorly designed policies of an electronic business can
foster deception by clients (Harris & Spence, 2002).  The goal of almost all electronic-commerce deceptions is
unjustified material gain and such deception is unethical.  Electronic commerce is also unethical when key
information for a transaction is deliberately withheld.
 
Laws regulate electronic commerce in most countries similarly to non-electronic commerce, and many deceptions in
cyberspace are illegal by similar laws.  For instance, it is unethical to fool customers in electronic commerce by
showing a picture of a related but not identical product to one a customer wants to buy.  The most serious unethical
deceptions satisfy the legal definition of fraud such as selling stock in nonexistent companies.
Email deceptions: spam and phishing
 
Unwanted commercial email or "spam" often involves deception since it is advertising and most advertising is
deliberately deceptive.  Advertising is usually considered acceptable business practice unless it becomes too
obviously deceptive.  For instance, it is considered acceptable for a vehicle manufacturer to claim that their truck is
"tough" despite any evidence, but it is unacceptable to give false statistics showing that it has a longer lifetime than
the average truck.  However, antispam laws in the United States and other countries broadly prohibit spam because
the automated breadth of its delivery makes it a more serious nuisance than traditional forms of advertising.
 
The nature of cyberspace makes certain kinds of deceptive commercial activity more effective.  For instance, links in
email and on the World Wide Web can be deliberately misleading so you think you are going to a different site than
you really are.  This can be done by making the wording of a text link false or vague, or making the link an image. 
Misleading links often occur in spam.  Such deceptions are unethical because they abuse the necessary trust for
online commerce.
 
Phishing is an especially serious email threat (Berghel, 2006).  This kind of scam is designed to accomplish identity
theft by inducing a victim, by email, to visit a Web site where their personal information such as account numbers is
collected.  Phishing requires mimicry of both the email and Web site of a legitimate business, usually a bank or other
financial service.  The victim is encouraged to visit the site through deceptive urgency in the form of alleged
emergencies or serious threats, as well as by deceptive links.  This works best when the mimicry is very precise, as
small details such as the address of the mimicry site can betray the deception.  For instance, a phisher might use
"bankofamerica.net" or "bank_of_america.com" to imitate a legitimate site "bankofamerica.com".  Phishing




Adware is software that displays advertisements on your computer.  Often it is tied to a desirable free software
product.  Then the adware is the price you pay to run the product.  This is ethical if the user is aware of the tradeoff,
but many adware suppliers deceptively conceal the purpose of the software in long user agreements so that the user
cannot provide informed consent.
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Spyware is a more serious and rapidly growing problem (Awad & Fitzgerald, 2005).  It is software that secretly
reports details of what a user is doing on their computer to remote Web sites.  It can provide valuable marketing data
about what Web sites a user visits, but it almost always violates privacy and can enable identity theft.  Again, some
spyware vendors deceptively force the user to sign an authorizing agreement that is long and complex.  Deception is
more necessary than with adware because spyware does not benefit the victim.  (Awad & Fitzgerald, 2005) cites four
major deceptions of spyware: (1) changing settings or key system parameters, (2) surreptitious downloading, (3)
bundling with legitimate software, and (4) slowing systems and causing crashes.   These are unethical because they
violate privacy, hurt reliability of a system, and violate the principle that owners of something (a computer system)
should understand and approve its settings and configuration, much as the owner of a house has the right to approve
all activities taking place in it.
Deception by commercial software
 
Though infrequently acknowledged, legitimate and legal commercial software can be deliberately deceptive. 
Pressures of the marketplace can make software try to look better than it really is (Gotterbarn, 1999).  For instance,
help facilities may not provide much, or most of the control buttons may be useless or redundant.
 
Certain practices lend themselves to deceptive exploitation.  For instance, many commercial products take advantage
of their "captive audience" to advertise other products of the same manufacturer.  Often the main purpose of free
products is to market non-free products.  The user can be harassed repeatedly with "Do you want to upgrade?"
requests or advertising images scattered over a page, or can actually be misled into thinking an additional product
must be purchased.  Again, it is a matter of degree as to whether this is unethical.
 
Commercial software can also deceive to try to discourage users from using other products.  Microsoft, for instance,
has repeatedly added its own enhancements to the open-source standard HTML for Web pages in an attempt to lock
users into its own fee-based Web products, and has done similar ploys with several other open-source products. 
Such techniques can be considered unethical interference with fair competition, and are often described and
implemented deceptively.
 
Commercial software can also provide deceptively concealed unnecessary services.  For instance, the Microsoft
Windows operating system now contains a large amount of features that most users never use and are not aware of,
apparently as a reason to encourage users to keep buying updates although its basic features have not changed
significantly from Windows 95 in 1995.  Such unnecessary code increases the vulnerability of the software to
malicious attacks, and can be considered unethical in much the same way as a doctor who performs unnecessary
surgery on patients to increase his or her income.
Deception in electronic games
 
Computer games are ubiquitous, and deception is becoming a serious problem with them.  Most cheating in games is
acquisition of additional information about the game known to only a few players ("cheat codes") and is not usually
deceptive.  But now with the growth of distributed multiplayer games, deceptions occur where players manipulate
their computer software to unfairly give themselves additional capabilities and knowledge; this is possible because
some of the game software must be kept on the player's computer for the game to run sufficiently fast (Hoglund and
McGraw, 2007).  Deceptions can involve finding loopholes in game rules in abnormal situations, such as by aborting
play halfway through an action.  Many deceptions are considered unethical by game companies and other gamers,
and perpetrators can be blacklisted from games because of it.  Deception can also occur in multiplayer games with
collusion between players to form alliances or build up credits by staged encounters.
Deception in cyber-attacks
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We now consider deception in direct attacks on computers and software in cyberspace, where deception is used to
control a computer or network for personal or group gain.
Eavesdropping
 
Since users of computers and networks often share the same hardware, there is a danger of a user being able to read
the private information of another if the software is not designed well.  An ethical person should refuse to do this. 
However, malicious people could deliberately eavesdrop on computer systems to learn secrets.  They could do this
by surreptitiously installing "sniffers", software that displays all traffic sent over a computer network.  Sniffers are a
legitimate useful tool for system administrators so they cannot be outlawed.  The ethical problems of eavesdropping
in cyberspace are similar to those of eavesdropping in general; users should be told if system administrators are




It is easy to assume a new identity on the Internet, where (unless you connect a video camera) no one can see what
you look like or how you are acting.  Using new online names is actually encouraged in many online communities
where anonymity is beneficial, as in online dating or in support groups for people with stigmatizing problems.  Some
users of the Internet go beyond this to develop online personas different from their real ones.  Such personas may be
harmless and can provide psychological benefits in role-playing which can be helpful in psychotherapy or just in
helping to understand a new point of view.  For instance, a teenager can adopt the name "gamemaster" and pretend
to be more knowledgeable than they really are to experience more adult interactions.  When such deceptions have
net benefits, they are usually ethical.  However, role playing can grow to interfere with relationships in the real
world, as when someone lies repeatedly about their accomplishments in discussion groups to reinforce serious
psychological problems, in which case it becomes unethical.  Deceptive role playing is key in "social engineering"
attacks on computer systems as discussed below.
Denial of service
 
A common attack in cyberspace tries to tie up resources of a victim computer or site with useless processing, what is
called "denial of service".  Its goal is to disable a site of which the attacker disapproves.  This usually involves
deception in the form of insincere requests for services.  For instance, a denial-of-service attack on a Web site can
involve sending millions of identical requests for the same Web page within a second from millions of sites.  Denial
of service exploits timing and surprise.
 
Denial of service has been used as a political tool against organizations that the attacker dislikes, as a form of civil
disobedience (Manion & Goodrum, 2000).  But it is really a form of vandalism that attacks the usability of the
resource, and is thus more invasive than traditional civil disobedience such as boycotts.  Thus most security
professionals consider it unethical even if used against ethically questionable targets.  Denial of service could create
serious harms if targeted against a critical resource such as a hospital.
Address spoofing
 
A frequent feature of malicious attacks on computer systems is deception in the attacker's location.  Data packets on
computer networks are supposed to identify the Internet address (IP address) of their source.  When attackers are
engaged in illegal activities, they often give false addresses.  While ordinary software cannot fake addresses, some
illegal software can.  Most authorities consider this unethical in the same way that malicious anonymous letters are
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unethical; the author of provocative data should assume responsibility for their data.  Accountability is important in
maintaining trust in a society.
Record manipulation and privilege escalation
 
Some attacks target data on computers, modifying or deleting it in unauthorized ways.  Since computers can record
everything that occurs on them, some cyber-attackers delete such "audit" data; since audit data is supposed to be an
objective record, tampering with it is definitely unethical.  Similarly unethical or illegal are tampering with job rating
reports with the goal of improving one's own rating, vandalizing Web pages to discredit the owner, and changing
business financial records for personal financial gain.
 
An important kind of record manipulation often done by attackers concerns their rights on a system.  Attackers
generally try to become authorized as system administrators of a system because that category of users has special
privileges in being able to modify the operating system.  A number of classic techniques such as buffer overflows
can enable such "privilege escalation" to facilitate other deceptions.  Again, this is abnormal usage of a computer
system with potentially dangerous consequences and should be considered unethical.
Trojan horses
 
Many common cyber-attacks involve Trojan horses.  These are programs that conceal a malicious intent by clever
design.  Common Trojan horses are computer viruses (malicious code inserted into programs), worms (malicious
self-reproducing processes) and spyware.  Viruses and worms are decreasing in importance, while spyware is
increasing (Sipior, Ward, & Roselli, 2005).  It is often difficult to trace the source of Trojan horses because they
attempt to subvert accountability.  Trojan horses are generally both unethical and illegal, since they are a form of
fraud as to the nature of computer programs.
 
Trojan horses can use steganography to communicate with controllers at other sites.  Steganography is methods for
sending concealed messages in innocent-looking data, such as a message concealed in the least-significant bits of a
picture.  Steganography is ethically questionable because activities on a computer system should be known to the
system and auditable.
 
The most dangerous Trojan horses are rootkits, programs used to replace key components of the operating system of
a computer.  They  invisibly take control of the computer, exploiting it for purposes such as identity theft, sending
spam email, or attacking and taking control of other computers.  Rootkits can also "hijack" sessions, connecting you
to Internet sites other than those you intend.  Sets of computers with installed rootkits can form "botnets", armies of
computers that attackers can control remotely for purposes such as denial of service.  Botnets have grown quickly as
a problem in the last few years.  Rootkits and botnets are definitely unethical and illegal.
Hacking
 
"Hacking" is often cited as a key ethical issue for computers and networks.  While the term is also used for software
modifications by anyone besides the authors of the software, it usually means malicious attempts of amateur
computer aficianados to break into computers for which they are not authorized.  Almost always deception is used to
circumvent the authorization.  Since most hackers begin when young, hacking is often similar to teenage trespassing
in the physical world: People do it for the excitement and thrill the forbidden.
 
Malicious hackers have proposed various ethical justifications (Spafford, 1992).  One is the "socialistic" idea that
computer systems are public resources available for whoever wants them.  This made sense in the 1960s and 1970s
when computer systems were rare resources, but is not valid today when computers are everywhere and are often
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filled with sensitive personal data.  Another is claim that hackers are honing valuable skills for the software
industry.  The skills necessary for hacking are a quite specialized with little relevance to software design, since
software rarely embodies stealth and deceit.  Another claim is that hackers offer free testing of computer systems to
alert their owners to security flaws.  A few small commercial companies use hacking methods ("red teaming") to test
the security of computers and networks.  However, often such information is hard to use since it does not clearly
suggest clear countermeasures.  Beyond that, we rarely see altruistic behavior from hackers, such as by reporting
flaws to clearinghouses such as www.cert.org.  On the contrary, malicious hackers often are very competitive and
want to conceal their attack tricks as much as possible.  Discoveries of attack methods are almost always made by
victims through inspection of log records and running intrusion-detection systems, not by hacker confessions.  Thus
we conclude that malicious hacking is unethical.
 
Note that many of the justifications advanced by hackers involve self-deception.  Much cyber-attacking involves
willful disregard of the implications of actions, such not thinking anything strange about needing to collect your
paycheck at a small Pacific island with liberal banking laws (Spammer X, 2004).  Having so little understanding of
what one is doing is unethical in itself.
Information warfare
 
Coordinated cyber-attacks can be used as tactics and strategies of warfare, what is called "information warfare"
(Bayles, 2001).  This raises ethical issues common to all forms of warfare (Nardin, 1998), but also some new ones
(Arquilla, 1999).  Ethical issues in warfare are covered in part by the Geneva Conventions and other international
agreements.
 
One ethical stance on warfare is pacifism, which views all warfare including information warfare as unethical
(Miller, 1991).  Even for those who accept limited warfare, information warfare raises serious ethical problems
because it is difficult to limit its collateral damage, a key issue with the Geneva Conventions.  When one drops a
bomb, the damage is limited to a small physical area; but when one uses a computer virus, the damage can easily
spread from attacked computers to civilian computers.  Spreading of damage is facilitated by the widespread use of
key software, such as the Microsoft Windows operating system, so that if an attack succeeds on one machine it can
succeed on many others.
 
The Geneva conventions also prohibit unprovoked attacks and say that counterattacks must be proportionate to the
attack and of a similar type.  Thus cyber-attacks cannot be counterattacks to conventional attacks.  Even legitimate
counterattacks can easily become disproportionate in cyberspace because of the difficulty in predicting and
monitoring how far an attack will spread (Molander & Siang, 1998), and thus become illegal.  Another problem is
that enemies in cyberspace try to be inaccessible to one another, so to reach an adversary an attacker must trespass
through many intermediate computers, few of which would cooperate if they knew (Himma, 2004).  Trespassing is
illegal and unethical.
 
Damage assessment is another key ethical problem with information warfare.  Unlike bombs, the damage caused by
cyber-attacks may be subtle, and it may be difficult to find and fix.  As is well known to programmers, what seems
to be a bug in one module may actually be a result of a bug in another, and attackers can exploit this to hide damage. 
So cyber-attacks may continue to harm victims long after a peace treaty is signed, much like chemical weapons or
battlefield mines, and thus may be unethical.  Since the source of a cyber-attack is difficult to track, it also may be
impossible to attribute an attack to a particular nation, or a false evidence may be planted to implicate an innocent
nation.  Finally, most cyber-attacks can only be used once against an adversary, since when the attack is recognized,
forensics experts can usually quickly determine its mechanism and devise countermeasures (Ranum, 2004).  This
means that cyber-weapons are very cost-ineffective; thus they are unethical considering all the more useful things on
which a society could spend money.
7/22/13 12:38 PMProposed chapter for the Handbook of Research on Technoethics:
Page 8 of 12http://faculty.nps.edu/ncrowe/technoethics_cyberdec.htm
Social engineering
 
On the border between cyberspace deception and conventional human deception are various forms of "social
engineering" designed to fool people into revealing key information for cyberspace such as passwords (Mitnick,
2002).  The ethical issues are similar to those of conventional deception.  Since many users of cyberspace do not
understand the reasons for security procedures, social engineering can be a very effective alternative to accomplish
attacks beyond the purely technical means described above..
Defensive deceptions in response to cyber-attacks
 
Offensive deceptions are difficult to justify ethically from a utilitarian standpoint because their benefit to society is
small and their harms can be large.  But the balance is different for defensive deceptions.  We often see deceptions in
military tactics as the recourse of a weaker force defending itself against a stronger (Dunnigan and Nofi, 2001). 
Defenders in cyberspace are often weaker than attackers because today's attackers can exploit a wide range of tools
with the element of surprise, even against highly-secure computers and networks.  So deception might be a good
defensive tactic in cyberspace.
Honeypots and honeynets
 
The most common defensive deception today is the honeypot.  This is a computer designed solely to be an attack
victim, with the goal of collecting data about attack methods (The Honeynet Project, 2004).  Honeypots can provide
the first notice of new kinds of attacks and permit experimentation with countermeasures.  Honeypots often are
implemented in groups on local-area networks called honeynets.  Honeypots do not need to entice attacks, as they
get sufficient numbers of attacks just by normal attacker network reconnaissance.
 
Honeypots must deceive to be effective because attackers want to avoid them.  Attackers know their activities will
be recorded on a honeypot, revealing secrets of attack methods and exposing them to possible legal retaliation. 
Furthermore, honeypots appear easy to attack, but this is illusory.  Honeypots must control the spread of attacks from
them to other machines since honeypots are only be permitted on a network if they do not hurt their neighbor
machines much.  Hence most honeypots limit the number of outgoing network connections in any one time period. 
So since attackers will avoid a honeypot if they can recognize it, defenders should camouflage honeypots to look like
ordinary machines.  For example, the Sebek tool of the Honeynet Project (www.honeynet.org) uses ideas from
rootkit technology to modify the listing features of the operating system to conceal itself and its data.  Honeypots
should also conceal their logging mechanisms, which tend to be more elaborate than on ordinary machines, and they
should conceal the mechanisms that limit outgoing attacks.  Such deceptions can be considered ethical since all users
of honeypots except the administrator are malicious, and the deceptions help reduce attacks both in the short run (by
wasting attacker time in fruitless activity) and in the long run (by recording them so countermeasures can be found). 
Note that users of any computer system must implicitly consent to some forms of monitoring for the system to work
well.
 
Since attackers want to avoid honeypots, another useful deception for defenders is to make  ordinary systems appear
to be honeypots, "fake honeypots" (Rowe, Duong, & Custy, 2006).  Real  honeypots may be detected by smart
attackers from subtle clues in code of their operating system, unusual delays on responding to commands, and the
absence of evidence of typical user activity in email and document files (Holz & Raynal, 2005).  Many of these clues
can be faked, inducing attackers to go away without a fight.  Such deceptions appear quite ethical because only the
most malicious users will look for them.
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Defensive disinformation
 
Another defensive ploy is to provide attackers with false information to confuse them.  "Low-interaction" honeypots
do this by pretending to offer services, ports, and sites that they do not actually have (Cohen & Koike, 2003).  They
do this by mimicking the initial steps by which the real protocols would respond.  Then when an attacker tries to use
these fake resources, they are met after a certain point in their interaction with error messages or failures to respond. 
As long as innocent users are not provided with the addresses of such machines, this should be quite ethical.
 
To be more convincing, honeypot file systems can be populated with real files and data from ordinary systems, as
defensive mimicry.  Directory design is more important in this than file design since attackers are unlikely to
examine many files.  Convincing directories can be constructed by simulating the average number of directories,
number of files per directory, depth of the directory tree, lengths of directory and file names, sizes of files, creation
and modification dates of directories and files, and so on (Rowe, 2006).  To intrigue attackers, passwords can be
associated with fake files or their content can be random characters suggesting encryption. These deceptions should
be ethical since only malicious users such as spies should be examining directories and files of a honeypot.
 
Disinformation can also be provided for an attacker of an ordinary machine rather than a honeypot.  If intrusion-
detection software assesses a user as sufficiently suspicious, deceptions can be foisted on them to interfere with their
typical attack goals.  Easy deceptions that are hard to disprove are false error messages claiming unavailability of a
resource that the attacker needs for their attack, such as network access or system-administrator privileges (Rowe,
2007).  Such deceptions may be more effective in inducing an attacker to leave than outright resource denial because
they can sound like temporary obstacles that will encourage an attacker to keep wasting time.  These deceptions may
not be ethical if the intrusion-detection assessment of a legitimate user is often incorrect, but the cost of a false
positive is only wasted time.
Deceptive delaying
 
A classic ploy of people faced with suspicious requests is to delay responding until more information is obtained
about the request or requester.  This is useful in cyberspace too.  For instance, an Internet site under a denial-of-
service attack should respond very slowly to requests; this not only deceives an attacker that they are slowing the
system, but provides more time to implement countermeasures like blocking certain incoming addresses.  Such
defensive tactics should be mostly ethical because they only slow activities.  However, they could be triggered by
legitimate users who accidentally do something suspicious such as downloading a large number of files together.  If
the likelihood of such behavior in nonnegligible, the ethics of delaying tactics is more questionable.
Deceptive intelligence gathering on the attacker
 
Deception can also gather information about an attacker to help track them or to prepare a legal case against them. 
One tactic is "honeytokens", digital bait for attackers (Spitzner, 2005):
Addresses of honeypots can be posted on Web sites, on bulletin boards, and in blogs to increase the malicious
traffic to them.
Passwords to machines can be planted in files on a honeypot to be found by attackers breaking into it.
Fake credit card numbers can be planted in a file, then any orders against those numbers checked for email or
delivery addresses.
Phishing Web sites can be automatically accessed and their forms filled out with obviously false data, making
it easier to detect phishers when they submit this data to banks and other victims.
Software with hidden spyware can be posted on a Web site for free download.  If an attacker installs it, it can
report where they are coming from and what they are doing.
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Again, it can be argued that these deceptions are ethical because they are passive acts that require additional illegal
actions by the attacker.  However, they are partly "entrapment" and, as well as ethical concerns, there are legal
limitations on how much law enforcement can use them.
Strategic deception
 
Deception can also be broader in cyberspace.  For instance, an organization could pretend that it has better
cyberspace defensive capabilities than it really does, to discourage adversaries from attacking it.  It could falsely
announce installation of a new software technology or a plan to buy highly secure machines.  Such strategic
deception does raise serious ethical problems because broad-scale deception affects many people and some are likely
to be hurt by it.  For instance, contractors may waste time trying to sell software to the organization for the
nonexistent capability, or the public may assume the organization is impregnable and underestimate risks to it.  It is
also difficult to maintain a secret involving many people, so many such deceptions will be revealed early.
Future trends
 
Deception will increase in cyberspace in the future as more human activities continue to shift there.  For attacks and
deceptive electronic commerce in particular, increasing countermeasures against them means successful attacks must
increase their deceptiveness to be effective.  At the same time, defensive deception is a new idea with much
potential, and it will show significant increases as well.  This means that ethical issues of what is acceptable
deception in cyberspace will be increasingly important.  But as deception increases, awareness of it will increase as
well, and ethical issues will be better formulated and understood by people.  Following consensus on key ethics
issues, we will see increasing numbers of laws and policies relating to cyberspace to enforce these ethical insights.
Conclusion
 
Many kinds of deception are possible in cyberspace as enumerated here.  Offensive deceptions are generally
unethical, and defensive deceptions are generally ethical.  Deceptions in electronic commerce may or may not be
ethical depending on their nature and the consensus of society.
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Key terms
 
Botnet: A network of computers with rootkits that are secretly controlled by a cyber-attacker.
Disinformation: Lies or propaganda.
Hacker: An amateur attacker in cyberspace.
Honeypot: A computer system intended solely to be a victim of cyber-attacks so as to collect valuable intelligence
about attack methods.
Identity deception: Pretending to be someone you are not.
Information warfare: Warfare attacking computers and networks, usually by software exploits.
Phishing: A deception involving email as bait to get victims to go to a Web site where their personal information can
be stolen.
Rootkit: Software that secretly permits a cyber-attacker to control a computer remotely.
Social engineering: Techniques to manipulate people to obtain information from them that they would not give you
voluntarily.
Spoofing: Pretending to operate from a different Internet address than you really are at.
Spyware: Software with a Trojan horse that secretly reports user activities over the Internet to a remote site.
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